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Abstract: The aim of this article is to examine the scientific and public functions of two- and 
three-dimensional  models  in  the  context  of  three  episodes  from nineteenth-century biology.  I 
argue that these models incorporate both data and theory by presenting theoretical assumptions in 
the light of concrete data or organizing data through theoretical assumptions. Despite their diverse 
roles in scientific practice, they all can be characterized as mediators between data and theory.  
Furthermore, I argue that these different mediating functions often reflect their different audiences 
that  included  specialized scientists,  students,  and  the general  public.  In  this  sense,  models  in 
nineteenth-century biology can be understood as mediators between theory, data, and their diverse 
audiences.
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Models  are  ubiquitous  in  scientific  practice  and  of  crucial  importance  in  a  large  variety  of 
disciplines. Despite  their  abundance,  models  are  not  clearly  defined  entities  and  their 
overwhelming diversity – consider theoretical models in quantum physics compared to anatomical 
teaching models – undermines the prospects of an all-encompassing definition (Leonelli 2007). 
One way of reacting to this situation is to distinguish between different kinds models such as 
theoretical,  two-dimensional,  or  three-dimensional  models.  Many  current  debates  draw  this 
distinction at least implicitly by focusing solely on theoretical models. Especially philosophers 
follow Ian Hacking in considering a model “something you hold in your head rather than in your 
hands” (1983, p. 219).1 It its clear that theoretical models often differ considerably from two- and 
1 For discussions of theoretical models in philosophy of science, see Bailer-Jones (2009) as well as Frigg and 
Hartmann (2006). Discussions of material models are more common in the history of science, see Dirks and Knobloch 
(2008) and especially Hopwood and Chadarevian (2004). Natascha Myers proposes an interesting account that 
combines theoretical and material models “in the  embodied imagination of the modeler”  (2007, 63). 
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three-dimensional models and it seems that we can avoid many definitional problems by clearly 
distinguishing between them.
However, even if we focus on only one type of models, definitions still have clear limits. In the 
case  of  three-dimensional  material  models,  there  do  not  seem to  be  any physical  or  abstract 
features that distinguish material models from other material objects. A scientific model that is 
made  with  a  toy  construction  kit  (such  as  some  DNA-models)  does  not  have  any  physical 
properties  that  distinguish it  from a toy – the very same object  could be a  toy in a different 
context. Whether an object is a scientific model or toy crucially depends on how it is used. The 
same point can be made with respect to other objects such as jars with peas in different colors as 
they are sometimes found in biological teaching collections. Whether these jars are a model of 
Mendelian inheritance or just a food stock solely depends on how they are used. Furthermore, they 
could “turn” into a model of Mendelian inheritance for just an hour by being brought to class by a 
biology teacher.
If there are no physical or abstract features that distinguish material models from other material 
objects,  material  models  have to be understood in the context of scientific  practice:  an object 
qualifies as a model if and only if it is used in specific ways. This agency-focused approach is 
consistent with much of the current philosophical literature on models (e.g. Giere 2004, 2010; 
Myers  2007)  but  it  does  not  solve  the  problem  that  models  are  far  too  diverse  to  allow  a 
substantial  and  all-encompassing definition.  Of  course,  it  is  possible  to  point  out  some  very 
general functional features of scientific models. For example, models are used as representations 
of something else such as an object, a process, a fact, or a theory. Furthermore, they are usually 
non-arbitrary representations in the sense that their representation is not purely conventional. This 
distinguishes  models  from  arbitrary  linguistic  representation.  The  word  “embryo”  is  a 
representation but it is not a model of an embryo as the connection between the word and its 
referent is entirely arbitrary.
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Unfortunately, general characterizations of material models (or even scientific models in general) 
such as “physical objects that are used as non-arbitrary representations” will not provide a precise 
definition  with  necessary  and  sufficient  conditions.  For  example,  not  every  non-arbitrary 
representation is a model. Sculptures and drawings are non-arbitrary representations but they are 
not necessarily models. Again, there are no physical or general functional features that distinguish 
statues or drawings that are models (e.g. a statue of a chimpanzee in a natural history museum or a 
drawing of chimpanzee in a biology book) and statues or drawings that do not qualify as models 
(e.g. a statue of a chimpanzee in an art gallery or a drawing of a chimpanzee in a comic book). A 
satisfying characterization of models will have to go beyond these general features and offer a 
more fine-grained description of the uses of models in scientific practice.
The goal of this article is to offer a more substantial philosophical characterization of two- and 
three-dimensional models by describing them in concrete historical and disciplinary contexts. By 
discussing  models  in  three  episodes  of  nineteenth-century  embryology  and  comparative 
morphology, I hope to be able to provide an account that is richer than a discussion of models that 
seeks a general definition of material or scientific models. My account is based on Mary Morgan 
and Margaret Morrison’s idea that models serve as mediators between theory and data (Morgan 
and  Morrison,  1999).  According  to  Morgan  and  Morrison,  scientific  models  are  not  simply 
derived from theory but they are not just data, either. Instead, they incorporate aspects of both 
theory and data and play an autonomous role as mediators between them. For example, models 
can be used to explore a theory that is already in place, but they can also serve as instruments for 
exploring processes for which theories do not give good accounts yet. 
Although Morgan and Morrison developed the framework of models as mediators with theoretical 
models in economics and physics in mind, I will argue that it also works surprisingly well in the  
context of two- and three-dimensional models in nineteenth-century biology. This extension of the 
framework of models as mediators should not be confused with a precise and general definition of 
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“scientific model”. On the contrary, Morgan and Morrison's proposal works so well for different 
modeling contexts because it is broad enough to encompass a diversity of mediating functions. A 
generalized  concept  of  models  as  mediators  helps  to  uncover  important  similarities  between 
different kinds of models even if it does not lead to an all-encompassing definition. 
While the concept of models as mediators between data and theory is helpful in characterizing the 
different  methodological  standards  of  model  construction,  I  also  argue  that  these  mediating 
functions have to be understood in the context of their diverse audiences. While research models 
were often created with the ambition to present very specific data to an equally specific audience, 
many  popular  models  embodied  general  theoretical  assumptions  through  schematized  and 
simplified representations. Furthermore, I argue that even models that were intended for rather 
specialized audiences often reached a broader public and became of crucial  importance in the 
public  engagement  with  science.  I  therefore  suggest  to  describe  models  in  nineteenth-century 
biology as mediators between theory, data, and their diverse audiences.
Models on Paper
In 1863, 26-year  young Ernst Haeckel held his first major lecture on evolutionary theory at a 
meeting of the Gesellschaft Deutscher Naturforscher und Ärzte (Assembly of German Naturalists  
and Physicians) in Stettin, today Szczecin, in western Poland. Four years after the publication of 
The Origin of Species,  the audience was well-aware of the controversies surrounding Darwin’s 
work. However, Haeckel’s goal with this lecture was not just to introduce evolutionary theory but 
to introduce evolutionary theory as the battle ground of two fundamentally opposed world views: 
If, despite these and many other difficulties, I try to draw you into the strife that has arisen as result  
of Darwin's theory of Evolution, it is because of the vast dimensions that this strife has already 
assumed.  Already  the  whole  vast  army  of  zoologists  and  botanists,  of  palaeontologists  and 
geologists, of physiologists and philosophers is divided into two widely separated parties. On the 
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standard of the progressive Darwinists are the words ‘Evolution and Progress.’ From the camp of 
the  conservative  foes  of  Darwin  sounds  the  cry:  ‘Creation  and  Species.’  (Haeckel  1924,  4-5, 
translation, Haeckel 1883, 4)
Haeckel’s contribution to this “strife” was meant to be twofold. On the one hand, he wanted to 
educate the public by presenting evolutionary theory in a non-technical way. By the end of the 
nineteenth century,  he would become the most  influential  popular science writer  in Germany. 
Haeckel sold 100.000 copies of his  Welträthsel  in the year of its publication and the book was 
translated  into  twenty-four  languages  (Richards  2005,  2-3).  On the  other  hand,  Haeckel  also 
understood himself as a scientist who contributed to the advancement of evolutionary theory – 
most importantly with his marine biological and embryological research. 
Embryology was at the very core of Haeckel’s evolutionary program and supposed to provide a 
major  source  for  the  understanding  of  phylogenetic  development.  Haeckel’s  basic  idea  is 
expressed by the recapitulation theory (or biogenetic law) which he summarized as the idea that 
“ontogeny recapitulates  phylogeny“ (e.g.  Haeckel  1866, 371;  1872,  276;  1874,  58).  Haeckel's 
starting point was Karl Ernst von Baer's observation that embryos develop from general to more 
specific forms and only gradually acquire species-specific characterists (e.g. Von Baer 1828, 223). 
In his recapitulation theory, Haeckel offered an evolutionary interpretation of this observation by 
arguing that the ontogenetic development actually recapitulates the evolutionary history of the 
species (cf.  Churchill 2007). Humans, for example, are phylogenetically more closely related to 
other mammals than to amphibians, and closer related to amphibians than to fish. This is why a 
human  embryo  “at  an  early stage  has  essentially  the  anatomical  structure  of  a  fish,  later  the 
constitution of amphibian and mammalian forms” (Haeckel 1874, 4). In this sense, recapitulation 
theory promised the reconstruction of the evolutionary history of species through embryological 
research.  
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The  general  claims  of  the  recapitulation  theory  were  mediated  by  specific  models  of  the 
ontogenetic development of vertebrates. Figure 1 shows the initial formation of embryos of a dog, 
a hen, and a tortoise. They are indistinguishable and therefore seem to support Haeckel’s claim 
that vertebrates share an early stage in ontogenetic development. Figure 2 shows eight vertebrate 
embryos  in  different  developmental  stages.  During  the  first  stage,  the  embryos  are  almost 
indistinguishable. The second row shows specific features of fish and amphibian embryos, while 
the  remaining  embryos  only  differ  in  details.  In  the  last  row,  all  embryos  are  clearly 
distinguishable. Nevertheless, the four mammalian embryos share many morphological features 
that separate them from the four other vertebrate embryos.
Figure 1 Woodcut from the Natürliche Schöpfungsgeschichte. Three vertebrate embryos (dog, chicken, tortoise).  
Ernst Haeckel: Natürliche Schöpfungsgeschichte, Berlin: Reimer, 1868, 248. 
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Figure 2 Woodcut from the Anthropogenie. Developmental stages of eight vertebrate embryos. Ernst Haeckel,  
Anthropogenie, Leipzig: Engelman, 1874, 256.
Haeckel’s embryo drawings fit the framework of models as mediators between theory and data 
well as they present the recapitulation theory in the light of specific anatomical details which are 
by  no  means  implied  by  the  general  theoretical  assumptions  that  Haeckel  was  promoting. 
Although Haeckel did not discuss the sources he used for his drawings, he most likely relied on a 
variety  of  publications  from other  scientists  such  as  Kölliker  and  Bischoff  (Hopwood  2006; 
Richards 2008, 242) as well as his own observations. Haeckel's eclectic and undisclosed use of 
different  sources  would  later  become  a  focus  of  criticism and  Haeckel  certainly  utilized  the 
available sources in an often casual way to make his theoretical points. This is especially evident 
in his illustration of three vertebrate embryos (Figure 1) that seemed to support the recapitulation 
theory because of their stunning similarity but were simply printed from the same woodcut. In 
Figure  2,  Haeckel  also  simplified  representations  in  order  to  stress  similarities  as  they  were 
predicted by his theory. For example, Haeckel's drawings neglected size differences and excluded 
the yolk  material  from the  pictures  because they would  distract  from similarities  which  were 
essential for the recapitulation theory (Haeckel 1874, 256). 
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While all of this illustrates the dominance of theoretical assumptions in Haeckel's illustrations, he 
did not ignore the available data and he did not invent details to support his theories. For example,  
he used the same woodcut in Figure 1 because his own observations and the available literature 
had convinced him that there are no morphological differences between vertebrates at this early 
stage of development (Richards 2009, 153). Haeckel clearly used a top-down approach that was 
dominated by his recapitulation theory but the drawings served this goal so well because they 
presented the general theoretical claims in the light of concrete data. Haeckel used accurate data 
but selected and organized it in a way that made a strong case for his theoretical framework. In 
this sense, his drawings were designed to mediate between a general theory and concrete data. 
Haeckel’s drawings may appear innocent if they are understood as simplified models; however, 
the way he presented them provoked criticism which later developed into a public scandal. The 
first open challenge to Haeckel’s embryo drawings was published by the comparative anatomist 
Ludwig  Rütimeyer  in  the  Archiv  für  Anthropologie (Archive  for  Anthropology).  Ludwig 
Rütimeyer was outraged that Haeckel presented his drawings as evidence and not as schematic 
illustrations, accusing him of “playing with the public and science” (Rütimeyer 1868, 302). An 
even more  momentous attack came from the Swiss embryologist Wilhelm His who did not just 
discuss  Haeckel’s  embryos  in  detail  but  also  questioned  his  scientific  integrity:  ‘I  grew  up 
believing that of all qualifications of a naturalist, reliability and the unconditional respect for the 
truth are the only ones which can not be spared. [...] Let therefore others worship Haeckel as the 
active and ruthless leader, in my opinion he has lost the right to count as an equal among serious 
researchers” (His 1875, 171). 
In a series of influential publications, Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison have argued that the feud 
between His and Haeckel has to be understood in the context of a broader conflict of different 
epistemic traditions. According to Daston and Galison, His' work was influenced by the ideal of a 
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“mechanical objectivity”, while Haeckel was part of an older morphological tradition which took 
idealizations as an important and necessary precondition of a true understanding of nature. “When 
Haeckel followed the older  usage in using his drawings to extract  "the essential",  or what he 
believed to be the true idea hidden beneath the false appearances, His indicted him for sinning 
against objectivity” (Daston 2001, 20; see also Daston and Galison, 1992, 2008, chapter 4).
Daston’s  and  Galison’s  assessment  of  the  His-Haeckel  controversy  has  been  criticized  for 
presenting Haeckel as a naïve proponent of an outdated epistemic tradition. According to Robert 
Richards,  the contrast  between two concepts  of  objectivity  obscures  that  “the epistemological 
situations for His and Haeckel were […] exactly the same: on the basis of individual examples, 
they produced through judgment and experience a standard organism; each reproduced what he 
thought and not what he immediately perceived” (Richards, 2008, 311, emphasis in the original). 
Richards  argues  that  the  epistemological  disagreement  between  His  and  Haeckel  is  better 
understood as a disagreement about the relation between data and theory. While His subscribed to 
a  “paleo-positivist”  and  inductivist  methodology,  Haeckel  considered  data  and  theories  to  be 
inextricably entangled. According to Richard's view, Haeckel was convinced that theories are not 
only derived from facts but that they can play an active and important role in the discovery of new 
facts.
I  think that  the  concept  of  models  as  mediators  can help  to  clarify the  situation.  Models  are 
mediators in the sense that they incorporate aspects of both data and theory. However, models can 
be  mediators  in  different  ways  and  the  controversy  between  His  and  Haeckel  illustrates  the 
diversity of these mediating functions. As I will discuss in more detail in the next section, His 
developed  an  explicit  theory  of  material  models as  research  publications.  According  to  His, 
material models are important because they allow a precise presentation of anatomical details. As 
His put it in his short opinion piece Ueber die wissenschaftliche Wertung veröffentlichter Modelle 
(On the Scientific Evaluation of Published Models): “I regard complicated spatial relationships as 
only fully understood when they are available as plastic representations and I consider the model, 
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even more than the written word, the decisive record of the understanding of form” (His 1895, 
359).2  His’s ideal of models as research publications is closely connected to the technological 
innovation of the microtome that fundamentally changed the practice of anatomists and radically 
altered embryological modelling (Hopwood 1999). The microtome provided thin-cut sections that 
not  only  revealed  anatomical  features  more  precisely  but  provided  a  new kind  mechanically 
retrieved  data  as  a  basis  of  His'  highly  systematic  drawings  as  well  as  three-dimensional 
reconstruction of embryos with wax models.
His considered models an opportunity for research as they allowed for a precise representation of 
anatomical relations. This ideal of precise research models seems to be consistent with Daston’s 
and Galison’s interpretation of “mechanical objectivity” as well as Richardson’s presentation of 
His as an inductivist “paleo-positivist.” However, it is important to note His' own qualifications. In 
the beginning of his Anatomie menschlicher Embryonen (Anatomy of Human Embryos, 1880), His 
discusses  different  modes  of  representation:  descriptions,  photographs,  drawings,  and  three-
dimensional models. In his discussion of drawings, His explicitly acknowledges the importance of 
interpretation.  Every  drawing  –  no  matter  how precise  –  has  to  focus  on  aspects  the  author 
considers essential and has to neglect aspects the author does not consider important (His 1880, 6). 
Given His' awareness of the complexity of different modes of representation and the irreducibility 
of subjective elements, neither Daston’s and Galison’s “mechanical objectivity” nor Richardson’s 
“paleo-positivism” seem to offer an entirely balanced account of His' stance
However, even if we take His' sophisticated discussion of two- and three-dimensional models into 
account, there can be no doubt that he advocated modeling as a research strategy that allows a 
precise representation of anatomical forms. This process might be interpretative to some degree 
because it  requires the selection of important aspects but His'  ideal still  clearly contrasts  with 
Haeckel’s use of drawings as tools for the presentation of general arguments about evolution and 
embryology. While His' account of modeling can be described as data-driven in the sense that it 
2If not otherwise stated, translations are my own.
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presented models as a medium for a more precise representation of anatomical details, many of 
Haeckel’s drawings are clearly theory-driven in the sense that they utilized eclectic sources with 
the goal of making theoretical points. It is certainly no coincidence that the controversy focused on 
one of Haeckel’s  most  iconic illustrations  of his  recapitulation theory:  where Haeckel  saw an 
opportunity to illustrate his theoretical framework in the light of embryological data, His saw a 
violation of the standards of scientific modeling. 
Reframing the controversy between His and Haeckel as a debate between different accounts of 
modeling has the advantage of allowing a balanced account that does neither simplify His' nor 
Haeckel's position.  The contrast between data- and theory-driven modeling is not absolute but 
gradual. His acknowledged that every model requires interpretation while Haeckel’s illustrations 
do not only present a theory but a theory in the light of concrete data.  His and Haeckel do not 
subscribe to two fundamentally opposed epistemologies but they stand at two opposing ends of the 
gradual spectrum of different modeling functions. 
My presentation of the controversy between Haeckel and His presupposes that Haeckel's drawings 
qualify as models. Any characterization of two-dimensional representations as models, however, 
implies an awkward conceptual situation as there are countless drawings and illustrations that we 
do not want to consider models. The characterization of drawings as models, therefore, appears to 
inflate the discussion of models in an unacceptable way unless there is some clear distinction 
between drawings that qualify as models and drawings that do not qualify as models. 
A  convenient  reaction  to  this  situation  seems  to  be  the  exclusion  of  two-dimensional 
representations from a discussion of models. If we accept both theoretical and three-dimensional 
models,  however, this exclusion remains ad hoc and systematically unsatisfying.  For example, 
why should a three-dimensional representation of an embryo qualify as a model of an embryo 
while a two- dimensional representation of the same embryo with the same anatomical details 
does not qualify as a model? Furthermore, an exclusion of two-dimensional representations does 
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not solve the conceptual problem as it reappears in the case of three-dimensional models: there are 
also countless three-dimensional representations – from religious statues to animal-shaped candy – 
that we usually do not want to consider models. 
The framework of models as mediators can help to clarify this situation by ignoring abstract and 
physical  properties such as overall  similarity and focusing on the uses of models  in scientific 
practice: a two or three-dimensional representation is a model if it is used as a mediator between 
theory and data..3 We do not need to inflate a discussion of two- and three-dimensional models if 
we restrict it to objects that play a mediating role in scientific practice. This is why Haeckel's 
embryo  drawings  qualify  as  models  while,  for  example,  illustrations  in  children's  books  or 
paintings usually do not qualify as models
So far, the reconceptualization of two- and three-dimensional models as mediators between theory 
and data has proven helpful in at least two crucial ways. On the one hand, it offers a framework 
for understanding the controversy between His and Haeckel as being based on a methodological 
disagreement about the diversity of modeling functions. On the other hand, the characterization of 
models as mediators has also proven helpful in distinguishing models and other representations 
that we do not want to consider models.  Two-dimensional models, for example, may not  look 
different from other illustrations, but they are used in a different way. 
Despite these explanatory benefits, I also think that a discussion of two- and three-dimensional 
models requires an extension of Morgan and Morrison's framework. Any comprehensive account 
of two- and three-dimensional models in eighteenth-century biology will have to move beyond 
their internal scientific functions and consider their role in communicating with diverse audiences 
and especially the general public. Haeckel's embryo drawings provide an excellent example for 
this necessity. The rage of Haeckel’s critics would not be understandable if the controversy would 
have  been  only  about  the  epistemology  of  modeling  and  it  can  seem  bizarre  that  German 
3 A similar point is made by Nickelsen (2006) who describes eighteenth-century botanical illustrations as models. 
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biologists of the 1860s and 1870s focused on a few illustrations instead of debating the core issues 
of evolutionary theory. 
However, Haeckel’s models were more than “a few illustrations,” they were powerful tools in the 
public  presentation  of  his  evolutionary  program.  This  popularizing  function  of  Haeckel’s 
illustrations is not independent from their epistemic function as mediators between theory and 
data.  Haeckel’s  illustrations  were  so  successful  in  public  because  they  presented  general 
theoretical claims such as the biogenetic law trough nontechnical and vivid illustrations. As I will 
discuss  in  the next  sections,  models  in  nineteenth-century biology had diverse audiences  that 
included scientists, students, and the general public. Furthermore, the methodological differences 
in the construction of models often reflected different intended audiences and therefore cannot be 
understood independently of them. 
Models in Wax
Haeckel only created models on paper. Two-dimensional drawings were easy to include in his 
popular publications and also met his artistic interests. However, the second half of the nineteenth 
century also saw an increased interest in three-dimensional scientific models, mostly driven by the 
demand of scientific university collections (Ludwig and Weber, forthcoming). Although wax was 
already a popular material during the eighteenth century and utilized by model makers such as 
Clemente Susini and Josef Benedikt Kuriger,4 the outstanding importance of wax models within 
nineteenth-century embryology is most closely connected to the work of Adolf Ziegler and his 
second son Friedrich Ziegler. 
Wilhelm His invited Adolf Ziegler in 1867 to Basel in order to learn the creation of wax models 
(Hopwood 2004, 186). The collaboration between His and Ziegler turned out beneficial for both 
4 On Susini see (Cattaneo 1970); on Kuriger see (Suter 1986); on anatomical models in the eighteenth century in 
general, see also Maerker (2006).
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sides. Ziegler’s advanced methods of modeling gave His the opportunity of presenting scientific 
models as serious research publications. In the case of three-dimensional objects such as embryos, 
material models promised more detailed and more precise representations than two-dimensional 
drawings. The collaboration was equally fruitful for the Zieglers. Material models in embryology 
were not an immediate commercial success as they required more time and resources than two-
dimensional  drawings.  However,  His’  ongoing  campaign  for  the  use  of  material  models  in 
embryology was an important aspect of the later success of the Zieglers and by the early 1880’s 
most embryologists accepted modeling as a crucial part of their scientific practice. The Ziegler 
Studio for Scientific Modeling largely benefited from this development and was able to establish 
itself as the almost unchallenged marked leader in the production of embryological wax models.5 
Given the controversy about Haeckel’s embryo drawings, a collaboration between Haeckel and 
the Zieglers might seem unlikely. The Zieglers worked closely with His, whose bitter feud with 
Haeckel was well-known. Adolf Ziegler had not only taught His how to model in wax, the Ziegler 
studio also produced embryological models based on His' research on several occasions between 
1869 and 1892.6 Still, Adolf Ziegler produced a model series “authored” by Haeckel in 1876. The 
simultaneous collaboration with both His and Haeckel was possible because Ziegler kept out of 
their feud. A letter  from Ziegler to Haeckel during the peak of the controversy illustrates that 
Ziegler maintained a friendly but cautious correspondence. Haeckel had sent Ziegler a copy of his 
Ziele und Wege der heutigen Entwicklungsgeschichte (Aims and Approaches of Contemporary  
Developmental History), a book full of insults against His, who was described as incompetent and 
insincere (Haeckel 1875). Ziegler’s response was polite but he refrained from taking sides. Instead 
of  waging  in  on  the  embryological  issues,  Ziegler  stressed  his  insufficient  understanding  of 
scientific matters.7 
5 Other model makers who produced anatomical wax models include Rudolf Weisker and Paul Loth, see Hackethal  
2008, 22-23.
6 For a list of Ziegler models, see the documentation in (Hopwood 2002, 164-166). 
7 Ziegler A., 1875. “Letter to Ernst Haeckel“, 11/30/1875.1 Archive of the Ernst-Haeckel-Haus.
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Haeckel  had  developed  his  gastraea  theory  in  series  of  publications  during  the  1870s,  most 
importantly  his  Kalkschwämme  (Calcareous  sponges)  (Calcareous  sponges,  1872) and Die  
Gastraea-Theorie,  die  phylogenetische  Classification  des  Thierreichs  und  die  Homologie  der  
Keimblätter (The Gastraea-Theory, the Phylogenetic Classification of the Animal Kingdom and  
the  Homology  of  the  Germ  Layers,  1875). The  starting  point  for  Haeckel’s  theory  was  the 
discovery of germ layers which had been described by Christian Pander in 1817 and Karl Ernst 
von Bear in 1828. Dividing all animals into organisms with germ layers (metazoa) and without 
germ layers (protozoa), Haeckel assumed that the similarities in the early ontogenetic stages of 
metazoa proved not only their common descent but were also explainable within the framework of 
the recapitulation theory.  More specifically,  Haeckel assumed that all metazoa would form the 
two-layered, cup-like gastrula early in their development (see Figure 3.).
 
Figure 3 Illustration of the process of gastrulation.. Ontogenetic stages of Gastrophysema. Ernst Haeckel: Studien  
zur Gastraea-Theorie, 1877, Jena: Dufft, Table VIII. 
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Figure 4 Ziegler wax models of the process of gastrulation ’authored’ by Haeckel, 1875 or later; Museum  
anatomicum Jenense - Anatomical Collection of Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena. Photo: Rosemarie Fröber.
Applying  the  recapitulation  theory  to  the  process  of  gastrulation,  Haeckel  concluded  that  all 
multicellular  animals  have  a  common  ancestor  in  a  gastrula-like  species.  Haeckel  later 
summarized this theory in his bestseller  Die Welträthsel: “in all the metazoa only two primary 
layers appear at first, and these have always the same essential significance […] I called the germ, 
which always arises first from the impregnated ovum, and which consists of these two primary 
layers, the ‘gut-larva’ or the gastrula; its cup-shaped body with the two layers encloses originally a 
simple digestive cavity, the primitive gut […]. From this similarity, or homology, of the gastrula 
in all classes of compound animals I drew the conclusion, in virtue of the biogenetic law, that all 
the metazoa come originally from one simple ancestral form, the gastraea, and that this ancient 
(Laurentian), long-extinct form had the structure and composition of the actual gastrula, in which 
it is preserved by heredity.” (Haeckel 1899a 37; translation Haeckel 1905, 61).
One can easily imagine that the possibility to produce a model of the gastrulation process put 
Adolf  Ziegler  in  an  ambivalent  position.  On  the  one  hand,  the  collaboration  with  Haeckel 
promised additional attention and increasing sales. On the other hand, it also created the danger of 
becoming  involved into  bitter  debates  as  the  gastraea  theory was  a  crucial  part  of  Haeckel’s 
phylogenetic approach to embryology. Although Ziegler finally agreed to produce the models (see 
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Figure  4),  his  commercial  expectations  were  not  met.  In  fact,  the  sales  were  a  huge 
disappointment. 
The failure of the Haeckel-enterprise did not stop the Ziegler Studio from becoming extremely 
successful from the 1880s on.  On the one hand, this development  can be partly explained by 
general  technical  innovations  in  wax  modeling,  especially  Gustav  Jacob  Born’s  plate 
reconstructions,  which  made  embryological  modeling  cheaper,  quicker,  and  more  exact 
(Hopewood 1999; Wellner 2009). On the other hand, the Zieglers were restless in advertising their 
products,  presenting  them at  conferences  and  exhibitions,  and  keeping  contact  to  established 
scientists.
Understanding  the  role  of  the  Ziegler  models  in  scientific  practice  requires  a  more  careful 
evaluation  of  their  audiences.  My discussion  so  far  suggests  a  rather  simple  dichotomy.  By 
following His' ideal of models as research publications, the Zieglers targeted a scientific audience 
while Haeckel's popular illustrations provide examples of models that were targeted at the general 
public. Given this contrast, the Ziegler models of Haeckel’s gastraea theory appear as a rather odd 
exception. While there is certainly some truth to this characterization, it also oversimplifies the 
complex interactions between these models and their audiences. 
An adequate account will requires a more complex picture than the simple contrast between  a 
scientific and a public audience. Ludwik Fleck's (1935) account of thought collectives offers such 
a picture as it distinguishes between a diversity of audiences along an esoteric-exoteric spectrum. 
The most esoteric circle is a highly specialized thought collective of scientists such as the group of 
physiologically oriented embryologists in the case of His. Highly specialized thought collectives 
are part more inclusive groups such as embryologists in general which are again part of the group 
of biologists.  Furthermore,  Fleck does not limit  this  esoteric-extoric spectrum to scientists  but 
explicitly includes students and finally also non-academic audiences to his analysis.
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Fleck  (1936,  107)  stresses  that  publications  are  often  targeted  at  specific  audiences  in  this 
esoteric-extoric spectrum. For example, highly specialized research publications are intended for 
an equally specialized esoteric circle,  textbooks are intended for students, and popular science 
books are intended for an exoteric audience beyond academia. There appears to be an analogous 
structure in the case of models as His' models were conceived as research publications of highly 
specific anatomical details that are only of interest for an esoteric circle while Haeckel's models 
served as illustrations of general theoretical assumptions of relevance of a much more exoteric 
circle. This observation suggests that the His' and Haeckel's different ideals of modeling are at 
least partly the result of their intentions to reach different audiences.
However,  even  models  that  had  an  esoteric  target  audience  often  reached  a  broader  public. 
Although  the  Ziegler  models  were  materializations  of  His'  ideal  of  models  as  research 
publications, they were not only of interest for embryologists who were concerned with highly 
specific anatomical details. Instead, much of the Ziegler's success was based on the use of their 
models in academic education and even today countless German university collections still hold 
Ziegler  embryo  models.8 Nick  Hopwood  even  argues  that  “[t]eaching  became  unimaginable 
without their publications, and involvement in new microscopical methods ensured the press a 
near monopoly in active fields of research” (Hopwood 2004, 170).  
Finally, Ziegler models also became popular objects and reached non-academic audiences. For the 
general  public,  embryology  had  become  an  outstandingly  interesting  science.  In  nineteenth- 
century Germany, public schools barley taught anything about biology and certainly nothing about 
topics  related  to  sex.  From the  1860s on,  however,  popular  science  books such as  Haeckel’s 
Natürliche Schöpfungsgeschichte and the Anthropogenie started to fill the gap and by the end of 
the century countless popular books, sexual education lectures,  hygiene exhibitions and shows 
brought embryology to the public and made them even an often used motif in  fin de siècle art.9 
8For examples, see the digital database of models in German University Collections: 
http://www.universitaetssammlungen.de/modelle/suche/krp/30
9For embryos as a in fin de siècle art, see Menon (2004). For the Haeckel's influence on early sexology in Germany, 
see Iwan Bloch's and Magnus Hirschfeld's contributions to the the second volume of the festschrift Was wir Ernst  
Haeckel verdanken. (What we owe to Ernst Haeckel, Schmitt-Jena 1914)
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Although the Ziegler models were conceived as academic objects and the relationship between 
academic embryology and public sex education was complicated, their success with the general 
audience is obvious. The most impressive document is a picture of Friedrich Ziegler’s contribution 
to 1893 Worlds Fair in Chicago. Ziegler’s display was two-and-a-half meters high, four-and-a-half 
meters  wide,  and  showed  embryos  of  humans,  vertebrates,  invertebrates  as  well  as  the 
development of several body parts. The display even won the Fair’s highest prize (Hopwood 2004, 
192). 
In the last section, I argued that models can be understood as mediators between theory and data in 
different ways. His proposed an account of models as research publications that starkly contrasts 
with Haeckel's use of models as illustrations of general theoretical assumptions.  While I have 
interpreted  this  as  a  methodological  contrast  of  different  roles  of  theory  and  data  in  the 
construction  of  models,  this  section  adds  a  further  dimension  to  this  conflict  by focusing  on 
different audiences. Ziegler models had at least two distinct target audiences: scientists who would 
be able to “read” the models as research publications and students who would benefit from precise 
models in the initiation to the esoteric circle. These target audiences clearly contrast with the far 
more  exoteric  circle  that  was  reached  by  Haeckel's  publications  and  at  least  partly  explain 
differences in methodological standards of model construction. 
Furthermore,  the  tendency of  models  to  reach  beyond  esoteric  circles  was  recognized  by the 
Zieglers and  made the collaboration with Haeckel an interesting enterprise. It was also recognized 
by both Haeckel and His, although they reached opposing conclusions. For Haeckel, the potential 
of models to communicate to broader audiences made them a important tool in the popularization 
of evolutionary theory.  For His, this  potential  came with a responsibility that was violated by 
Haeckel to a degree that he “lost  the right to count  as an equal among serious researchers” (His 
1875, 171). Although I have argued that we should follow  Morgan and Morrison in describing 
models as mediating between theory and data, these issues suggest that an exclusive focus on the 
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methodology of modeling will not adequately capture the role two- and three-dimensional models 
in  nineteenth-century  biology.  Instead,  it  seems  more  adequate  to  describe  these  models  as 
mediating between theory, data, and diverse audiences that often reached beyond esoteric circles 
and made biological issues accessible to a broader public.
Models in Glass
Contrary to wax, glass does not seem to be a likely material for biological models. Glass is not 
only a highly fragile material, it is also tremendously difficult to create realistic glass models of 
living organisms. Still,  two of the most celebrated model makers of the nineteenth century were 
Leopold and his son Rudolf Blaschka who established themselves with magnificent glass models 
of invertebrates.10 While Leopold's early glass animals were solely based on Philip Henry Gosse’s 
beautifully  illustrated  Actinologia  Britannica11,  later  models  drew  from  a  wide  variety  of 
publications as well as conserved and even living sea creatures. 
Ernst Haeckel's influence on the Blaschkas’ later work is obvious, although there are not enough 
sources to give a complete account of their personal and professional relationship. Haeckel was of 
outstanding importance for marine biology of the nineteenth century and many of Haeckel’s 4,000 
newly described species were cast in glass by Leopold and Rudolf Blaschka. Furthermore, we 
know that the Blaschkas borrowed biology books from Haeckel’s private collection.12 During the 
nineteenth  century,  it  was common for scientists  as well  as model  makers  to  use each others 
illustrations and models as templates,  so that it  is often not possible to determine the original 
source of a specific Blaschka model. In some cases, however, the influence of Ernst Haeckel is 
obvious. Most importantly,  the Blaschka models of radiolarians, a group of unicellular marine 
organisms,  were  based  on Haeckel’s  groundbreaking monograph  Die Radiolarien  (Rhizopoda  
10 On the Blaschkas, see Reiling's groundbreaking publications (1998, 2000, 2009).
11 On Gosse, see (Thwaite 2002) and (Gosse 1907).
12 The Ernst-Haeckel-Archive in Jena contains several letters from Leopold and Rudolf Blaschka to Ernst Haeckel. 
(see Hoßfeld and Breidbach 2005) 
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radiata), published in 1862. The previously almost unknown radiolarians did not only provide the 
topic for Haeckel’s  habilitation thesis  but also for his  first  major  contribution to evolutionary 
theory.  Under  the  microscope,  the  radiolarians  revealed  a  stunning  symmetry  and  Haeckel 
arranged them into a “natural system” along two criteria: the relation of the skeleton to the central 
capsule and the overall form of the skeleton. 
According to Haeckel, radiolarians support evolutionary theory, because the transitional character 
of many morphological characteristics can only be explained by a common Urform (primordial  
form): “Through the whole long series of these figures runs a continuous red thread so that I am 
able to make the attempt to portray the relationship and the mutual relations of all  types in a  
genealogical  relationship  chart  and even to  seek  a  Urform,  from which all  others  forms  may 
possibly be derived.” (Haeckel 1862, 233) Haeckel did not only conclude that an Ur-radiolarian 
must have existed, he rather offered a specific model of the primordial form. Haeckel postulated 
Heliosphaera actinota (Figure 5 and Figure 6) as the Ur-radiolarian by arguing that the diversity 
of radiolarians must have developed through a deformation of simple and symmetrical forms as 
they are found in Heliosphaera actinota.
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Figure 5 Haeckel’s illustration of the radiolarian Heliosphaera actinota which he took to be comparable to the “Ur-radiolarian”.  
Ernst Haeckel, Die2222Radiolarien (Rhizopoda radiaria), Reimer, Berlin, 1862, Plate IX. 
Figure 6 Photo of Blaschka glass model of the Ur-radiolarian Heliosphaera actinota.
The model is still part of the zoological collection of the Humboldt University Berlin, photo by Helmholtz-Zentrum für  
Kulturtechnik
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Haeckel’s drawings of radiolarians seem to offer a further example of his theory-driven approach 
to biological  modeling:  Haeckel’s  “Ur-radiolarian” was a highly speculative construct  and his 
presentation of Heliosphaera actinota as an Ur-radiolarian was clearly driven by his ambition to 
provide a unified evolutionary theory of radiolarians. Despite these theoretical ambitions, it would 
be a mistake to present Haeckel's work on radiolarians as detached from data. On the contrary, 
Haeckel based his evolutionary account of radiolarians on extensive research and painstakingly 
detailed observation. In fact, Haeckel's work on radiolarians was groundbreaking because it was 
unique in its empirical depth and breadth. 
Haeckel's  work  on  radiolarians  again  illustrates  how  the  framework  of  models  as  mediators 
between theory and data can be helpful for understanding modeling in nineteenth-century biology. 
Haeckel's illustrations of radiolarians were based on uniquely detailed and comprehensive data. At 
the same time, these data were presented as evidence for a speculative phylogenetic account of 
development of radiolarians through deformation.
Furthermore, Haeckel's discussion of radiolarian forms needs to be understood in the context of 
the  German  morphological  tradition  which  made  the  striking  and  often  almost  perfectly 
symmetrical  forms  of  the  radiolarians  more  than  just  a  curious  observation.  For  Haeckel, 
morphology provided the essential guide to taxonomy, physiology, and phylogeny (Daston 2006, 
63).  The  morphological  perspective  also  allowed  a  connection  between  scientific  and  artistic 
interests as the work of Haeckel as well as the Blaschkas illustrates. On the one hand, Haeckel and 
the  Blaschkas  considered  their  models  scientific  objects  and  exact  representations  of  nature. 
Haeckel based his radiolarian work on extensive research and the Blaschkas' work became famous 
because of its stunning naturalism. The Blaschka models were created with the ambition to mimic 
nature in an as detailed and accurate manner as possible. On the other hand, the models were also 
artistic objects and materializations of a morphological perspective that focused on the stunning 
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forms  of  radiolarians  as  evidence  of  highest  importance.13 Haeckel’s  monographs  were  often 
generously illustrated and his Kunstformen der Natur (Art Forms of Nature) even explicitly tried 
to bring art and science together. In the foreword of the Kunstformen, Haeckel stated he “was not 
only trying to recognize the laws of design and development [of organisms], but also to penetrate 
deeper into the mystery of their beauty” (Haeckel 1899b, Vorwort). 
The ambiguous role of the radiolarian models between science and art is equally striking in the 
case of the Blaschka glass models. At first glance, the Blaschka models seem to be artistic rather  
than scientific objects as they combine outlandish forms with an unlikely material. However, the 
Blaschkas did not produce their models as artistic interpretations but as exact representations of 
nature. Their goal to produce precise scientific models becomes especially evident in their late 
botanical models. In 1890, the Blaschkas signed an exclusive contract with the botanist George 
Lincoln Goodale to produce glass models for a collection at Harvard University (Parke 1983, 116-
122).  For fifty years,  the Blaschkas  worked to produce a collection of about  4000 models  of 
plants, flowers, and botanical details. Goodale saw the commissioned models as scientific objects 
which  were  used  to  teach  phylogenetic  botanical  classification.  The  glass  models  were  not 
idealized  representations  with  conventionalized  characteristics  but  mimicked  nature  by 
representing  individual  plants  as  realistically  as  possible.  The  Blaschka  models  even  showed 
individual  peculiarities  and included aspects  such as  shrivelled  or pitted  leaves.  The stunning 
accuracy of the glass models allowed Harvard students to train botanical classification without 
field research and the laborious search for appropriate living species. 
While radiolarian models offer another example of models as mediators between theory and data, 
their  mediating  functions  again  cannot  be  understood  independently  of  their  audiences.  The 
ambition to  mimic nature through accurate and vivid models clearly reflects their intended use as 
teaching  models.  As  students  did  not  have  access  to  living  specimens  of  many  aquatic 
13On the relation between science and art in Haeckel’s work see (Breidbach 2006), (Krauße 1995), (Lötsch 2001) . 
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invertebrates and plants, the Blaschka models had a well-defined role in academic teaching. At the 
same time, they also embodied a morphological and aesthetic perspective on nature which allowed 
them to reach a broader public. A selection of glass flowers was presented at the Parisian Worlds 
Fair and Goodale actively utilized the breathtaking appearance of his scientific collection. Even 
after the glass models ceased to serve as teaching tools, the ‘Ware collection of glass models’ 
remained a  public  spectacle,  attracting  almost  200,000 visitors  a  year  (McNally and Buschini 
1993) by combining accurate botanical details with an artistic presentation of nature. 
The case of the Blaschka models provides a further example of how models can have a variety of 
audiences as described by Fleck through his esoteric-exoteric spectrum. Models fit Fleck's rough 
distinction of three types of audiences (1936, 105-07) as they were intended to reach specialized 
scientists  (e.g.  His'  ideal of models  as research publications),  students (e.g.  Blaschka teaching 
models), and the general audience (e.g. Haeckel's illustrations). However, models in nineteenth-
century biology also can be described as having an “exoteric bias” in the sense that they often 
reached a broad audience even if they were originally intended for a more esoteric circle. This is 
not only the case with Haeckel's intentionally popular models but also with Blaschka as well as 
Ziegler models. An account of models as mediators in the context of nineteenth-century biology 
therefore has to take their public functions into account. None of the discussed models simply 
mediated between theory and data in an isolated scientific context but they also mediated between 
esoteric scientific issues and an exoteric audience.
My discussion suggests that this “exoteric bias” of models can be partly understood through their 
theoretical component which made them more relevant to the general public than other objects and 
illustrations. This is especially evident in the case of Haeckel's illustrations that became the center 
of a public scandal because they transported a far-reaching theoretical context. Similar points can 
be made about the Blaschka models that did not only represent botanical details but also a highly 
aesthetic morphological view on nature. Finally, even the Ziegler models became relevant for a 
larger  audience  because  they  presented  developmental  processes  that  may  have  been  well-
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established and uncontroversial among specialized scientists but provided a novel and fascinating 
perspective for more exoteric audiences. 
While  this  theoretical  component  is  an  important  factor  in  the  public  success  of  models  in 
nineteenth-century biology, it does not explain their appeal to larger audiences compared to other 
forms of theory presentation. An explanation of their public success therefore cannot be limited to 
a discussion of the theory component but also has to consider how these models presented theory 
in  the  light  of  concrete  morphological  and  anatomical  details.  Again,  Haeckel's  illustrations 
provide the most obvious examples. Even readers who had never read a specialized academic text 
about recapitulation theory and only had basic knowledge of evolutionary biology were able to 
“see” the relation between humans and other vertebrates in Haeckel's illustrations. A similar point 
can be made with respect to the Blaschka models. Visitors of  Harvard's Glass Flowers Collection  
did not need detailed background-knowledge about German morphology and the ideal of a unified 
aesthetic  and  scientific  perspective  on  nature  in  order  to  see  the  “artforms  of  nature”  in  the 
Blaschka models.  What  made models  often more  attractive  for a  general  audience  than other 
forms  of  theory  presentation  was  their  presentation  of  theory  through  accessible  and  vivid 
representations of morphological and anatomical forms.
To sum up, I have suggested that the methodological issues of mediation between theory and data 
are  closely entangled  with their  intended and unintended audiences.  On the one hand,  I  have 
argued that different methodological standards in the construction of models reflect their different 
intended audiences as illustrated in the contrast between His research models for an esoteric circle 
and Haeckel's popularizing models for an exoteric circle. On the other hand, I have argued that 
models often reached broader audiences because they incorporated both far-reaching theoretical 
assumptions  as  well  as  concrete  morphological  and  anatomical  details  that  ensured  their 
accessibility. In this sense, models are paradigmatic examples of the ideal of Anschaulichkeit that 
played a crucial role in the increasing presence of material models and scientific collections in 
German academia of the nineteenth-century (Ludwig and Weber, forthcoming). 
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Understanding the Plurality of Modeling Functions
This article has presented models in nineteenth-century biology as mediators between theory, data, 
and diverse audiences. It has also been argued that the slogan “models as mediators” refers to a 
diversity of modeling functions. For example, mediation between data and theory can occur in 
very different ways. His' models were conceived as research publications that provide a precise 
presentation  of  anatomical  details.  Although  His  acknowledged  that  models  are  inevitable 
interpretative in the sense that they require the evaluation of aspects as important or insignificant 
for the model, he still tried to establish material models as exact representations of anatomical 
structures. Haeckel’s drawings contrast with His' “research models” in the sense that they often 
serve as illustrations of general theoretical frameworks. For Haeckel, nothing less than everything 
was always at stake. For example, his models of the gastrulation process were not only meant to 
be illustrations of microscopic observations but they served as evidence for the general gastraea 
theory.  And Haeckel did not stop there. The gastraea theory was understood as evidence for the 
recapitulation theory which was again understood as a major pillar of evolutionary theory. Finally, 
evolutionary theory was presented as the foundation for a general monist philosophy. Haeckel’s 
work exhibits a clear line from the most specific topics such as the ontogenetic development of a 
specific species to the most general principles of his monistic worldview. However, it would be 
wrong to claim that Haeckel’s models are “nothing but theory.” All of his illustrations – no matter  
whether they presented vertebrate embryos,  the process of gastrulation, or different radiolarian 
forms  – were based  on the data  that  was available  for  Haeckel  and presented  his  theoretical  
framework in the light of this data.  
In the introduction of this article, I discussed the overwhelming diversity of scientific models that 
makes any attempt to offer a precise and all-encompassing definition of “model” appear hopeless. 
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Although my characterization of models as mediators between theory, data, and the public does 
not lead to a definition with necessary and sufficient conditions, I hope that it has proven to be of 
analytical value by offering a framework for understanding the role of models as mediating tools 
in  scientific  practice.  More  specifically,  I  think  that  this  characterization  is  helpful  in 
understanding at least three aspects of two- and three-dimensional models in nineteenth- century 
biology.
First, the framework of models as mediators allows to understand the controversy between His 
and Haeckel as being based on different ideals of modeling that may be described as data- and 
theory-driven. For His, models were useful as research publications that provided a more precise 
representational  strategy  than  traditional  print  publications.  For  Haeckel,  models  provided  an 
opportunity of presenting his general theoretical assumptions in the light of concrete data. 
Second, I have argued that the framework of models as mediators offers a better understanding of 
the distinction of models and other representations that do not qualify as models. This is especially 
evident in the case of Haeckel's drawings as any discussion of two-dimensional models faces the 
problem that there are countless illustrations that we usually do not want to consider models. I 
have  argued that  we can  understand Haeckel's  drawings  as  models  because  he  used  them as 
mediators  between theory and data.  Haeckel's  illustrations  of  embryological  development,  the 
process of gastrulation,  and of  Heliosphaera actinota  qualify as  models  not  because the look 
different than other illustrations but because they were used in a specific way. 
Third, I have argued that models in nineteenth-century biology did only mediate between theory 
and data but also between a diversity of audiences that include specialized scientists, students, and 
the general public. It is important to consider these audiences in the mediation between theory and 
data because different methodological standards of model construction often reflect these different 
target  audiences.  Furthermore,  I  have  argued  that  models  in  nineteenth-century  biology often 
reached larger audiences because they incorporated theoretical assumptions of general importance 
in the light of accessible morphological and anatomical details. 
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Models remain elusive entities in the history and philosophy of science that are of undisputed 
importance but resist attempts to offer an  all-encompassing definition. A discussion of models 
within specific historic and disciplinary contexts does not solve this definitional problem, but it 
can provide a framework for an understanding of the roles of models in scientific practice. Of 
course,  such  a  framework  will  always  reflect  the  specifics  of  the  involved  case  studies.  For 
example, I have barely talked about the use of materials models in experimentation and theory 
construction although this function is clearly of utmost importance in different scientific contexts 
(see,  e.g.,  Weisberg  2007 or  the  literature  on model  organisms such as  Leonelli  and Ankeny 
2008). At the same time, the characterization of models as mediators appears to be helpful as it is 
applicable in very heterogeneous scientific contexts. While Morgan and Morrison proposed this 
framework in the context of theoretical models in economy and physics, I have argued that it also 
proves  helpful  in  a  discussion  of  two-  and  three-dimensional  models  in  nineteenth-  century 
biology. It remains to be seen to what degree this framework will also prove helpful in further  
contexts such as the use of material models in experiments and theory construction. 
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